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This study purports to explain security rights violations of the suspected 
terrorism. It develops a theoretical model and assesses its predictions on a 
sample of post-Soviet states. The author uses original data on security rights 
violations of individuals implicated in terrorism and their family members and 
supporters collected by means of systematic content analysis of several types of 
reports. Contrary to a widely-held belief that the magnitude of terrorism is the 
main determinant of human rights practices in the context of ‘war on terror’, the 
study finds no support for the impact of terrorist attacks on security rights 
violations of the suspects of terrorism. Political conflict, on the other hand, 
appears to be a stronger predictor of security rights violations in the post-Soviet 
nations. Statistical results also lend support to the impact of international norms 
and a number of other factors on human rights violations in the name of 
combating terrorism. The author discusses implications of the findings for theory 
and practices of human rights. 
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Security Rights Violations in the Context of Counterterrorism:  
Analysis of the Post-Soviet Nations 
 
This study purports to explain security rights violations of the suspected 
terrorism. It develops a theoretical model and assesses its predictions on a 
sample of post-Soviet states. The author uses original data on security rights 
violations of individuals implicated in terrorism and their family members and 
supporters collected by means of systematic content analysis of several types of 
reports. Contrary to a widely-held belief that the magnitude of terrorism is the 
main determinant of human rights practices in the context of ‘war on terror’, the 
study finds no support for the impact of terrorist attacks on security rights 
violations of the suspects of terrorism. Political conflict, on the other hand, 
appears to be a stronger predictor of security rights violations in the post-Soviet 
nations. Statistical results also lend support to the impact of international norms 
and a number of other factors on human rights violations in the name of 
combating terrorism. The author discusses implications of the findings for theory 
and practices of human rights.  
 
 Key words: security rights violations, counterterrorism 
 
Since first recognized under international law, human rights have existed in tension with 
security considerations. Recently, a pervasive security-oriented agenda promoting states’ 
obligations to combat the threat of terrorism has revived the challenge to human rights. 
Some governments have been quick to exploit the climate of insecurity to justify the 
long-standing repression of political opponents or punitive immigration measures citing 
the exigency of war on terrorism.1 Others have allowed for human rights violations by 
enacting extensive security legislation and denying terrorism suspects due process and 
the protection of law.2 Still other nations have shown restraint and resistance to the 
prevalent trends in counterterrorism opting for non-coercive preventive responses 
targeting causes of terrorism. What can explain this variation?  
The answer to this question has far-reaching implications not only for our 
advances in stopping human rights violations committed under the guise of combating 
terrorism but also for our efforts at limiting the spread of activities of terrorist 
organizations. Terrorism, a premeditated use of violence by non-state actors against 
civilians in the furtherance of broader political objectives,3 is the exact antithesis of 
human rights, a crime that takes individuals’ lives and jeopardizes their freedoms. It is a 
state responsibility to ensure the public’s protection from politically motivated violence 
of this type, and to safeguard people’s freedoms against those who wish to violate them. 
Oddly enough, the governments across the globe forsake their human rights commitments 
in the name of combating terrorism, thus defeating the very purpose of counterterrorism 
policies. Determining conditions affecting the degree to which a state is willing to 
sacrifice individuals’ freedoms under the pretext of fighting terrorism is important 
because ‘the full realization of human rights and the practice of genuine democratic 
processes throughout the world…’ is indispensable to the success of the war on 
terrorism.4 
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The goal of this work is to examine determinants of security rights violations of 
individuals implicated in terrorism, their family members and supporters, and other 
persons related to or acquainted with presumed terrorists (hereinafter, suspects of 
terrorism). Security rights violations consist of the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, 
unlawful detentions, trials, and disappearances of the suspects of terrorism. Seeking to 
explain the breaches of individuals’ security rights, I develop a theoretical model that 
capitalizes on the earlier studies of state repression and expands their arguments to 
include accounts of human rights violations that are unique to the context of 
counterterrorism. 
As a step toward a worldwide analysis of human rights and counterterrorism 
praxis, this study employs cross-sectional time-series analysis of 15 former Soviet Union 
republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan – 
studied over the period of 13 years (1993-2005). The author uses original data on security 
rights violations of the suspected terrorists collected by means of systematic content 
analysis of several types of reports. The statistical assessment of the patterns of security 
rights violations in a sample of post-Soviet states is meant to shed new light on the 
critical issues of politics and human rights that leave us concerned about the future of 
democracy, development, and fundamental freedoms not only in the former Marxist 
empire, but everywhere in the world. 
I begin by defining security rights followed by an outline of a theoretical 
framework describing conditions that prompt their violations. In the next section, I 
discuss operationalization and measurements of the concepts used to explain the denial of 
security rights to terrorism suspects. After a brief review of the design of empirical tests, 
I present statistical results and discuss implications of the findings for theory and 
practices of human rights. 
Conceptualizing Security Rights in the Context of Counterterrorism 
It has long been noted that states’ responses to terrorism differ in the extent of 
governments’ commitment to the rule of law and respect for human rights. These 
differences have been captured in the ‘war’ and ‘criminal justice’ models of 
counterterrorism responses that were developed on the premise of a teetering balance of 
repressive and legitimate means of fighting terrorism.5 In the ‘criminal justice model’ the 
strict observance of the rule of law outweighs the exigencies of the war on terror, while in 
the ‘war model’ this balance ‘tips from the protection of individual rights, as embodied in 
the rule of law, to the protection of the state, as embodied in the rules of war’.6 Another 
typology of states as ‘soft-’ or ‘hard-liners’7 refers to a series of ‘harsh and effective 
temporary measures to isolate and eliminate terrorist cells’ as pointers of the ‘hard-line’ 
approach to terrorism. 
Despite their general usefulness, these and similar classifications of states’ 
responses to terrorism are suboptimal for carrying out a comprehensive analysis of 
human rights practices in the context of struggle with terrorism. Originating in studies of 
counterterrorism strategies of liberal democratic states, these conceptualizations cannot 
be ‘stretched’ to counterterrorism policies of those states that lack a strong liberal 
tradition or are adverse toward democratic values. Dichotomizing a spectrum of 
counterterrorism measures into binary indices conceals important variation in the degree 
and types of human rights violations committed in the name of combating terrorism.     
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This study focuses on the nature and scale of security rights violations 
conceptualized as violations of human rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and Articles 6(1), 7, and 9(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966). These include the right to life, 
the right to habeas corpus, prohibitions of torture and cruel and unusual punishment as 
well as prohibitions of arbitrary arrest and detention. The manifestations of violations of 
these rights in the context of counterterrorism are extrajudicial killings, instances of 
torture and physical abuse, unlawful detentions, trials, and disappearances of a broad 
category of the suspected terrorists. 
There are several reasons for choosing the identified category of security rights 
over other human rights for the present analysis. Cognizant of the controversies 
surrounding the concept and typologies of human rights, and claims to universalism and 
primacy of some human rights over others, the author, nevertheless, concurs with those 
scholars who distinguish a category of the so-called ‘fundamental’ or ‘core’ rights that 
top the hierarchy of human rights.8 Extrajudicial killings, torture and physical abuse 
violate peremptory international norms safeguarding non-derogatory human rights that 
cannot be suspended under any circumstances.9 Because these rights have been regarded 
as intrinsically valuable to any human being, they have been granted a special normative 
status and recognition as ‘core’ human rights, or jus cogens.10 A greater importance of the 
right to life and protection from physical harm have been forcefully defended on the 
ground that the realization of these rights fulfils intrinsic psychological and safety needs 
which dominate individuals’ motivational life.11 
Freedom from arbitrary arrests and due process guarantee more complete 
gratification of human physiological and safety needs since the rights to life and 
prohibition of torture are intimately connected to freedom from arbitrary detention and 
basic procedural rights. When the latter are circumvented, individual’s rights to life and 
physical integrity are also jeopardized. Therefore, freedom from arbitrary arrests and 
procedural rights received a higher level of protection in the international legislative and 
judicial acts. The UN Human Rights Committee, for example, in its authoritative 
interpretation of international human rights law expanded the list of elements of the 
human rights regime that cannot be subject to lawful derogation in addition to the rights 
specified in Article 4 of the ICCPR.12 These elements, inter alias, include the following: 
all persons deprived of liberty must be treated with respect for their dignity; 
hostage-taking, abduction, and unacknowledged detention are prohibited; and the right to 
a fair trial essential for the protection of non-derogable rights cannot be suspended as 
well. 
 In addition to the legal and philosophical justifications for the choice of security 
rights, my determination to focus on the violations of the right to life, physical integrity, 
freedom from arbitrary arrests, and procedural rights is also driven by empirical and 
practical concerns. The conceptualization of human rights as a set of security rights 
reflects the actual experiences of the suspected terrorists and epitomizes the breaches of 
individuals’ rights that often occur in counterterrorism practices of individual states.13 It 
depicts the widely criticized practices of governments using torture against alleged 
terrorists, in the name of national security, removing them from the protective reach of 
the courts, denying them habeas corpus, or holding them in prolonged detention without 
charges or trial. Furthermore, counting security rights violations of the terrorism suspects 
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allows for the production of a continuous scale capturing the variation in the degree and 
‘style’ of human rights violations in both democratic and non-democratic states.  
Explaining Security Rights’ Violations in the Context of Counterterrorism 
Scholars have been studying human rights in the context of counterterrorism for quite 
some time, and the recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the topic. The events 
of September 11 and the subsequent war against terrorism have reignited debates about 
the precedence of national security interests over the exercise of individuals’ freedoms. 
There exists a plethora of articles, edited volumes, and monographs that survey political 
fallout of terrorist attacks and the human rights implications of the states’ 
counterterrorism responses.14 
 The scholarship of this type has examined complexities in finding a sensible 
balance between effective security measures and human rights, and gathered invaluable 
knowledge about the individual governments’ experiences in solving this problem. 
Regrettably, however, there have been few systematic attempts to explain similarities and 
differences in the ways states uphold or curtail human rights when they tackle the threat 
of terrorism. What has inhibited the development of general theoretical accounts of 
counterterrorism and human rights is the dearth of cross-sectional analyses of a wider 
range of democratic and non-democratic states and an insulated position of these studies 
in the broader realms of comparative politics and international relations. This literature 
has evolved at a distance from the broader scholarship of human rights rarely taking 
advantage of the wealth of theoretical and empirical knowledge generated by studies on 
state repression. 
This work bridges the scholarship on states’ counterterrorism policies with that on 
human rights. It also develops a theoretical model that integrates hypotheses and the 
extant empirical findings on the ways states balance demands for security with human 
rights into a single decision-making conceptual framework.  
The two approaches that dominate research on state repression and human rights 
are the ‘cost/benefit’ and the ‘strength/threat’ conceptual models.15 Both are the variants 
of the rational actor decision-making framework and share the assumption that the 
governing elites are interested in maintaining their political control and power. In the first 
model, political authorities assess socio-political and economic environment through the 
prism of ‘costs’ (factors that decrease power and resources) and ‘benefits’ (factors that 
increase power and resources) and repression is used when the ‘costs’ associated with it 
do not accede the expected ‘benefits’ from negative sanctions.16 In the second model, 
decision-makers assess their political strength vis-à-vis the magnitude of threats to 
regime. Repression is likely to be employed when the policy-makers believe that 
regime’s strength is less than the threat, or when the strength/threat ratio is decreasing 
relative to strength.17 In both models, variables may influence the extent of repression or 
other policy outputs directly by increasing ‘costs’ or threats relative to ‘benefits’ or 
regime’s strength, or indirectly by affecting decision-makers’ perceptions of the 
‘cost/benefits’ and ‘strength/threat’ ratios. 
My model of states’ human rights practices in the context of counterterrorism 
builds on the rational actor decision-making theoretical framework, but relaxes the 
assumption of strict rationality. It draws on the insights from political psychology and 
augments the model with psychological premises of decision-making. First, I assume that 
decision-makers’ behavior is always purposeful, i.e., it attempts to meet various goals and 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y.  Security Rights Violations in the Context of Counterterrorism: Analysis of the Post-Soviet Nations. 
The International Journal of Human Rights, 14(2): 166-188, 2010.  Publisher’s official version:  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642980802535492> .  Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 5 
needs, and the primary goal of ruling elites is maintaining their political power.18 Second, 
instrumental considerations often underlie decision-making by political elites. Therefore, 
when faced with the earnest threat, political leaders will be inclined to employ coercion 
for preserving their power. Third, like other individuals, decision-makers exhibit 
‘bounded rationality’. In their attempts to make sense of the complex reality for the 
purpose of effective action, they rely on various mental shortcuts for processing 
information and reaching decisions.19 Finally, non-instrumental considerations also 
penetrate decision-making process of the ruling elites. Expressive and normative reasons 
push decision makers toward policies that can gain them social approval from their peers 
at home and abroad, and enhance their positive self-image.20 Using these five 
assumptions, I will now explain the variation in states’ human rights practices in the 
context of counterterrorism.  
Since governments are motivated to stay in power and are inclined to use 
repression when their regime is facing a serous threat, terrorist attacks should provoke 
governments’ negative responses. Leaders’ reactions are typically more pronounced in 
the nations plagued with the threat of terrorism.21	   Even	   in	   the	   democratic	   states,	  
violence	   permeates	   governments’	   responses	   when	   they	   are	   confronted	   with	   the	  
gauntlet	  of	  terrorism	  and	  the	  necessity	  to	  curtail	  spiraling	  violence.22	   
	   Terrorism threatens the strength and longevity of the governing regime in several 
ways. Terrorist violence challenges the authority of political elites and undermines their 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force. It diverts their attention from other domestic 
aims since dealing with terrorist threats requires significant monetary and human 
resources. Terrorist acts generate fear and distress thus provoking public disappointment 
with the government incapable of protecting the lives and livelihoods of those under its 
jurisdiction. To refurbish their legitimacy and public support, governments will use all 
available means to liquidate terrorist groups and apprehend those suspected in 
terrorism.23 
	   Another	  reason	  for	  curbing	  freedoms	  in	  response	  to	  the	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  is	  
the	   lower	   ‘costs’	   associated	   with	   negative	   sanctions	   employed	   in	   the	   name	   of	  
counterterrorism.	  A	  sense	  of	  national	  insecurity	  quickly	  destroys	  public	  support	  for	  
inviolability	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  predisposes	   individuals	   to	   the	  surrender	  of	   their	  
rights	   in	  exchange	  for	  more	  freedom	  from	  fear.	  As	  former	  Chief	   Justice	  of	  the	  New	  
Mexico	  Supreme	  Court,	  Gene	  E.	  Franchini,	  has	  written,	  ‘[Fear]	  works	  like	  a	  charm.	  A	  
fearful	   people	   are	   the	   easiest	   to	   govern.	   Their	   freedom	   and	   liberty	   can	   be	   taken	  
away,	  and	  they	  can	  be	  convinced	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  was	  done	  for	  the	  own	  good	  –	  to	  
give	   them	   security’.24	   For	   many	   individuals	   and	   politicians	   alike,	   the gravity of 
terrorist attacks is a sufficient reason for taking away the legal protections of those 
suspected in terrorism.25 In short, governments are expected to use repressive political 
measure to protect their interests when faced with the threat of terrorism. I hypothesize 
that the effect of the magnitude of terrorist attacks on the violations of security rights will 
be in the positive direction. 
Political conflicts of different magnitude and duration – disputes, mass protests, 
civil and international strife – can also threaten the governing regime. The literature on 
state repression and human rights has consistently identified intense domestic opposition 
as an important determinant of human rights violations.26 The question then, becomes, 
how and why various forms of political opposition enter the equation accounting for 
differences in the extent of security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. 
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According to one explanation drawn from the multi-dimensional approaches to 
threat perception, the presence of political disturbances sensitizes leaders to the threat of 
terrorism. Terrorist attacks in the states experiencing political turbulence will be 
perceived as representing a higher level of threat and responded to more intensely.27 
Following another line of reasoning, policy makers, interested in maintaining their 
strongholds of power, will be inclined to use the tools available for fighting terrorism to 
cope with other types of political challenges. Russia, for example, has been notoriously 
known for the government-staged attacks on human rights defenders of the Chechen 
using the powers afforded by pervasive counter-terrorism and counter-extremism 
legislation. The Chinese leadership has used the tools acquired through participation in 
the global counter-terrorism efforts for deepening its crackdown on the ethnic Uighur 
community seeking independence. Egyptian authorities have a long history of using 
counterterrorism measures for suppressing peaceful dissent as well as punishing 
governmental opponents.28 Many other governments have utilized counterterrorism 
measures to justify their defiance of human rights. 
 According to the postulated assumptions, decision-makers seek domestic and 
international approval and strive to maintain their positive image and self-esteem. 
Repressive measures against legitimate political opposition and violations of 
humanitarian law never contribute to the enhanced political standing and rarely 
strengthen a sense of self-worth. When these same sanctions are framed as security 
measures applied to the suspects of terrorism, they gain a veneer of international 
respectability and greater domestic support. Terrorism is a very broad and ill-defined 
term that can be potentially used to stigmatize and prosecute all forms of opposition. The 
merit of such a fuzzy definition is that it provides for the equally broad and ill-defined 
ways to define counterterrorism.29 Governments experiencing tensions with their political 
opponents, particularly in situations involving violent separatist or nationalist dissent, 
will be inclined to repackage these challenges as terrorist threats and use against them 
tools available for fighting terrorism. Not only can these coercive actions fend off 
opposition and strengthen the rule of regime, but also provide authorities with a more 
legitimate mandate to sanction those rendered as suspects of terrorism. My expectation is 
that the higher levels of political conflict experienced by states will contribute to greater 
number of security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. 
The rational facility of decision makers largely determines their reactions to 
threats to the governing regime. Yet, these assessments are typically slanted toward 
different mental shortcuts and cognitive schemes that figure strongly in the decision-
making chain. Historical experiences play a dynamic role in the construction of security 
threats. The past security measures constitute a filter through which governing elites 
single out modal responses that are most familiar to them.30 Thus, historical memory 
predisposes political leaders toward habitual types of responses. I expect that the extent of 
violations of individuals’ security rights in the past will determine the levels of human 
rights violations in the present. 
As postulated above, ruling elites are also susceptible to normative impact. A 
steadily expanding stream of research on international norms offers a host of explanations 
for why non-instrumental concerns creep into the leaders’ rational decision making 
framework. Governments are deeply interested in the status of their states in international 
relations. Many seek legitimation or desire to maintain and enhance their reputation as 
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norm-compliant leaders and states.31 Psychologists contend that norm conformity is the 
default option32 since norm-compliance promotes positive social reinforcement and 
endows decision-makers with simple organizing and decision rules.  
There are two broad categories of international norms that are pertinent to states’ 
human rights conduct in the context of counterterrorism. Those are international human 
rights norms and norms prescribing states to undertake certain actions (or avoid taking 
actions) in different areas of counterterrorism. There is no direct conflict between 
counterterrorism norms and human rights norms. Human rights law establishes a 
framework within which terrorism can be dealt without infringing on fundamental 
freedoms. However, since the onset of the war on terrorism, several rhetorical and 
theoretical arguments have resurfaced in public and political debates in support of the 
repressive methods of struggle against terrorism. For instance, former President of 
Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze stated in 2002 that ‘international human rights 
commitments might become pale in comparison with the importance of the anti-terrorist 
campaign’.33 Some governments share a conviction that certain individuals should be 
excluded from under the protection of international human rights law. Terrorists are 
deemed undeserving of any international protection because of the heinous nature of their 
criminal acts.34  
Whether a state decides to comply with human rights or counterterrorism norms 
hinges on the strength of norms, among other factors. Several characteristics of norms, 
such as norms’ commonality and durability, determine their strength and the ensuing 
impact on governments’ actions.35 The commonality of international norms denotes how 
many actors of the international system share value-based expectations embedded in the 
norms. The greater the number of states adhering to international normative claims the 
higher the degree of commonality of international norms will be. Consequently, the 
impact of these norms on state policies will be greater. Durability signifies ‘how long the 
rules have been in effect and how they weather challenges to their prohibitions’.36 The 
longer the norm has been in existence, the stronger its impact will be. Consequently, the 
strength of human rights norms vis-à-vis counterterrorism norms reflected in their 
relative commonality and durability will affect the extent of security rights violations in 
the context of counterterrorism. I hypothesize that the greater commonality and 
durability of human rights norms compared to counterterrorism norms will be associated 
with fewer security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism.  
The human rights scholarship has identified a number of other factors affecting 
leaders’ propensity toward repression that I will include as controls in my model of 
human rights and counterterrorism. First is the type of political regime that has shown 
consistent and significant effect on the level of state repression. State monopoly on 
violence is severely constrained in liberal democratic states. The rule of law, the 
emphasis on bargaining and compromise as principles for handling conflicts, multiple 
and overlapping power pyramids, and a competitive system of elections of the major 
power-holders – have been listed in a roster of democratic factors restraining the power 
of elites.37 Coercive measures are very ‘costly’ in liberal democracies as they severely 
undermine legitimacy of the ruling elites, destabilize political situation, and, ultimately, 
weaken the rule of the governing regime. Repression is inconsistent with democratic 
ideas and values, and the employment of negative sanctions will generate not only public 
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and international condemnation, but also a state of cognitive dissonance in leaders’ 
minds.  
Economic development, like democracy, is expected to decrease state 
repression.38 Economic scarcity generates social and political tension, thus, destabilizing 
political systems of economically underprivileged states. Fewer economic resources limit 
the government’s ability to use alternative mechanisms of resolving societal grievance. 
Therefore, political authorities of the poor states will be more likely to opt for repressive 
tactics.  
Foreign assistance is another variable that can influence human rights landscape 
in the recipient states. The debate over the consequences of foreign aid on human rights 
has been a contentious one, and the results of empirical studies have been inconclusive.39 
The sparse analyses of foreign assistance have demonstrated that military aid has 
negative impact on human rights40 because it provides additional tools for fending off 
political threats to the government in power. Furthermore, the provision of foreign to the 
countries with poor human rights records can exacerbate human rights abuses by 
reinforcing the government’s belief in impunity from foreign sanctions as long as it 
serves security interests of states supplying aid. Therefore, I expect that foreign assistance 
will increase security rights violations I the context of counterterrorism. 
Many commentators and human rights activists have noted the impact of 
September 11th attack on the change in governments’ perspective on civil and political 
rights. The attack on the US soil and the subsequent worldwide counterterrorism 
campaign animated by the American leadership and manifested in the position of the UN 
Security Council, including its powerfully worded Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) 
that outlines extensive counterterrorism measures binding on states under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, tipped the rights/security scale to the detriment of human rights.41 In this 
new age of the global war on terror, tough measures have been assumed as necessary to 
protect state security. ‘After 9/11’, according to State Department counterterrorism 
coordinator Cofer Black, ‘the gloves came off’.42 I expect to find an increase in the 
violations of security rights in the post-9/11 environment. 
In sum, it is hypothesized that the extent of security rights violations of the 
suspect of terrorism will be determined by the magnitude of terrorist threat, the degree of 
political conflict, and past levels of security rights violations in the context of 
counterterrorism. Democratic mechanisms will be a barrier to negative sanctions; 
whereas economic scarcity and foreign aid will steer governments toward repression. 
International norms will serve as referent points guiding leaders’ policy choices. The 
relative commonality and durability of counterterrorism vs. human rights norms will 
affect the extent of security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. Finally, 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 became a catalyst for perilous changes in human rights 
practices across nations. 
Research Design 
In this section, I describe the design of empirical tests of the proposed explanations of 
differences in security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. Due to 
considerable efforts at collecting reliable data on human rights violations of the suspected 
terrorists, I chose to test my hypotheses on a sub-set of states. The estimation sample 
covers 15 states, the former Soviet republics of the USSR - Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, 
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Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan – studied over 13 years (1993 – 
2005). The unit of analysis is the country-year.  
This sample of states is suitable for the purpose of this research. There are many 
variables that can potentially influence human rights practices within individual states. 
Therefore, there is always a danger of excluding an important factor from the model 
venturing its misspecification. Because of the common political history, the post-Soviet 
states share certain characteristics, such as recently acquired or re-gained independence, 
experiences with democratization and authoritarian regimes, and societal attributes, 
which might influence governments’ decision to repress human rights but need not to be 
included into the model due to the homogeneity of this set of cases. At the same time, the 
country-years included into the sample are also representative of different types of 
political regime, levels of economic developments, the scales of political conflict and 
terrorism, and other background conditions.  
Importantly, the sample features variation on the types and scale of security rights 
violations of the suspects of terrorism that do not correspond to the patterns of general 
human rights abuses on the post-Soviet space. Belarus, Estonia, and Turkmenistan, for 
example, had no reported security rights violations of the terrorism suspects throughout 
much of the examined time-frame. Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan were 
occasionally noted for unlawful detentions and violations of procedural rights, with 
Kyrgyzstan, since recently, turning increasingly violent toward the alleged members and 
supporters of terrorist groups. Georgia, Russia, and Uzbekistan have habitually employed 
incommunicado detentions and torture against terrorism suspects, suspended habeas 
corpus, and stripped detainees of their basic procedural rights. These patterns constitute 
an empirical puzzle inviting a closer scrutiny of security rights violations in the context of 
counterterrorism in the post-Soviet states. 
Since the sample of states is not selected at random, no definite inferences can be 
made to the full universe of states. It does not mean, however, that findings of this study 
cannot be used for gaining a better understanding of factors that can influence the degree 
of governments’ compliance with internationally protected human rights in the context of 
counterterrorism, or for making theoretical inferences. If consistent with findings of the 
earlier studies, the results of the present analysis will lend credibility to the impact of 
certain conditions on states’ human rights practices within global as well as regional 
setting. The unconventional findings will generate new hypotheses inviting further 
examination of the workings of certain exogenous forces in the context of 
counterterrorism and analysis of regional dynamics.  
Dependent Variable 
Security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism is the dependent variable of 
the study accounted for by the number of extrajudicial killings, instances of torture, 
unlawful detentions, trials, and disappearances of the suspects of terrorism, their family 
members and supporters, and other individuals related to or acquainted with presumed 
terrorists. 
I counted the total number of confirmed violations of each type (i.e., the number 
of individuals whose rights were violated) that occurred in a country during the year and 
assigned this number a score based on the following rules: the score of 0 if no violations 
have been recorded; 1 – if violations happened occasionally (the number of violation is 
more than ‘0’ but less than ‘50’); and 2 – if violations are practiced frequently (the 
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number of violations is greater than ‘50’. The index of security rights violations was 
formed by adding the scores on each type of human rights violations.  
 There are numerous problems with the availability and reliability of information 
that can be used for taking measures on the extent of human rights violations by 
individual states.43 Therefore, achieving the level of precision of the human rights data 
that is necessary for meaningful and compelling cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses 
would be impossible if one uses raw counts of different types of human rights abuses in 
the context of terrorism. Following the widely accepted practice,44 I chose to use ordinal 
categories based on events data that fit the accuracy of the reported human rights 
violations and allow for meaningful comparisons among states. Another advantage of 
using ordinal comparisons is that it increases the reliability of coding into categories.45  
The summation of scores on five different types of security rights violations 
returned an index of security rights in the context of terrorism, which values range from 
‘0’ (no confirmed violations of different types of security rights) to ‘10’ (frequent 
violations of all types of security rights). Items combined in an index should be more 
inter-correlated with each other than with other items, thus demonstrating the uni-
dimensionality of a scale, a requirement for any social science concept.46 Loevinger’s H 
is one of the tests of whether items are sufficiently interrelated to justify their 
combination in an index.47 It allows verifying the fit of data on a set of items to the 
Monotonely Homogenous Mokken Model and validates their use together as a scale of a 
uni-dimensional latent theoretical construct. The ‘H’ statistic is a scalability coefficient 
demonstrating the strength of a particular scale. It is commonly accepted that the values 
of H exceeding 0.5 indicate a strong scale, values from 0.4 to 0.5 – a moderate one, and 
values from 0.3 to 0.4 – a weak scale.48 Loevinger’s H acquired from the test of the 
security rights violations index is H=0.624 demonstrating very strong scalability and 
providing empirical support for uni-dimensionality of the concept used in this study. 
	   I collected data on various types of security rights violations in the context of 
counterterrorism in stages using event data and content analysis techniques. Any 
particular instance of human rights violations can be thought of as an event that can be 
described in a natural language sentence that has an actor or a set of actors as its subject 
and object, and a set of actions as its verb.49 The news headings, human rights reports, 
and other accounts of political activities contain such descriptions of events in the form of 
‘who’ did ‘what’ to ‘whom’, ‘when’, and ‘why’. These descriptions can be converted into 
data sets by recording the dates of events, and coding actors, targets, and types of events. 
The coding of events described in the sources of data is done through the process of 
content analysis of sentences or full reports.  
The primary source of data that I used for the purpose of identifying and coding 
events describing security rights violations is the wire reports downloaded using the 
LexisNexis® Academic newswire service. The LexisNexis® Academic newswire service 
provides an extensive coverage of daily news. It contains broadcast transcripts and full 
texts of articles from hundreds of national, regional, and global newspapers and wire 
services. Today, LexisNexis® is the leading source of news available to academic 
institutions. While no news source is devoid of coverage biases, the fact that 
LexisNexis® is a global source that provides access to a comprehensive spectrum of 
information from thousands of sources from around the world substantially reduces this 
problem.  
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States were analyzed in the alphabetical order. I used the same search commands 
that generated a list of newswire reports describing actions, reactions, and interactions of 
each state represented by its agencies in the area of counterterrorism. Having downloaded 
newswire reports for a state, I content-analyzed the headlines singling out those articles 
containing any of the following verbs or nouns, or their synonyms: 
- Shoot (shooting), kill (killing), assassinate (assassination), liquidate (liquidation, 
mop-up, sweep) 
- Capture, abduct (abduction), detain (detention) 
- Torture, beat (beating), abuse, assault, threaten (threat), intimidate (intimidation), 
harass (harassment), force 
- Try (trial), prosecute (prosecution). 
The identified reports were read in full and content-analyzed using a coding scheme 
provided in Appendix 1. The reports for 70% of country-years were identified and coded 
by at least two coders. Coders’ inter-reliability coefficient ranged from 0.58 to 0.71 on 
different samples of data. All cases of low inter-reliability were resolved in coders’ 
meetings through discussion of individual cases. 
 In addition to LexisNexis® Academic news wires, I identified and examined 
Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports mentioning 
persecution of individuals for activities related to terrorism. The need for several sources 
of data on human rights violations in the context of counterterrorism is warranted for the 
purposes of this study. Some newswire reports may contain insufficient amount of 
information to make certain judgments about the illegality of trials, arrests, or 
prosecutions of the suspects of terrorism. Human rights accounts published by AI and 
HRW allow classifying governments’ human rights practices beyond question. Yet, the 
reports of international human rights organizations often make no references to the types 
of crimes that abused individuals are allegedly responsible for. The specific information 
about human rights conditions of the suspects of terrorism is typically lost in the general 
descriptions of ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ human rights abuses. The newswire reports, 
on the other hand, often contain important information about the types of courts in which 
the subjects of prosecution are tried (i.e., military vs. civilian), the number of defenders, 
and whether they were granted the basic procedural rights. Therefore, a holistic analysis 
of reports from three different sources was used to increase precision in classifying 
security rights violations of terrorist suspects and to separate general human rights abuses 
from those violations committed under the pretext of fighting with terrorism. 
Recognizing, that it is still impossible to acquire precise measures of security 
rights violations committed in the name counterterrorism (because data sources may 
differ in their estimates of human rights abuses, and war crimes can be mistaken for 
human rights violations in the situation of inter- or intrastate wars), I utilized the 
following approach. I identified the lowest possible and the highest possible estimate of 
human rights violations in each of the categories of security rights. The lowest possible 
scores were assigned based on the rule of the ‘presumption of innocence’ of state 
authorities, i.e., whenever there was a reasonable doubt as to whether individuals’ rights 
were violated in the context of counterterrorism, or about the scale of abuse, I would give 
the government the benefit of the doubt interpreting this uncertainty in favor of state. The 
highest possible scores were assigned based on the ‘presumption of guilt’, i.e., any 
evidence of negative sanctions used in the context of counterterrorism would be counted 
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against state authorities. The sum of the highest estimates and the sum of the lowest 
estimates form the brackets of minimum and maximum security rights violation scores. 
These total lows and highs provide a probable range of error for the estimate of security 
rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. To ensure the robustness of this 
study’s findings, I perform statistical tests on the minimum and maximum scores. Both 
scores are highly correlated with Pearson r=0.92.  
Independent Variables 
The magnitude of terrorism is measured by the total number of fatalities and injuries 
from all terrorist attacks that occurred within a state in a given year. Global Terrorism 
Database50 is a source of data on terrorist activity within states. All terrorist attacks 
registered in the database for a sample of country-years correspond to the conceptual 
definition of terrorism as a threatened or actual use of violence by non-state actors against 
civilian population carried out with the purpose of attaining broad socio-political goals. 
Because the extent of security rights violations may affect the magnitude of terrorism the 
latter is lagged one year behind the dependent variable to control for possible 
simultaneity bias.  
An index of political conflict was created to account for the existence of domestic 
or international conflicts and the degree to which these conflicts are resolved with violent 
means. To create the index, I adopted the Conflict-Barometer scale and data on violent 
and non-violent conflict collected by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict 
Research (NIIK)51 described in Table 1 below. A sum of scores on all conflicts within a 
state in a given year was used to form the final index of political conflict. The advantage 
of using the Conflict-Barometer scale is that the latter contains information about both 
latent and manifest conflicts. This information is important because many authors have 
pointed out that the scale of a state’s negative sanctions differs in the context of violent 
and nonviolent conflict.52 A one-year lag of the index is used in the tests to avoid 
simultaneity bias with the dependent variable.  
Table 1. Conflict Scale 
State of Violence  Intensity Group Level of Intensity  Name of Intensity  
 
Non-Violent Low 
 
1 Latent Conflict 
2 Manifest Conflict 
Violent Medium 3 Crisis 
High 4 War 
 
The lagged dependent variable is used to measure the extent of past security rights 
violations, and a 10-point additive democracy index (DEMOC) from the Polity IV 
dataset53 – as a measure of democracy.  
International norms are value-based expectations of appropriate behavior defined 
in terms of rights and obligations of actors with a given identity.54 Norms’ recognition by 
the international community often comes as a result of positive international law, such as 
in international treaties and conventions. The latter express ‘the position of the 
community of nations as to what conduct is and is not acceptable; they tell the 
international community what are the norms and code of conduct of civilized nations’.55 
Multilateral treaties are, therefore, especially useful for the identification of international 
norms.56 The existence of international norms can also be inferred from consistent and 
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general usage among states and acknowledgment of norms in international judicial and 
legal practices.  
Today, there are 12 universal conventions pertaining to the suppression, control, 
or prevention of terrorism that regulate states’ counterterrorism responses.57 Four human 
rights treaties – ICCPR, Optional Protocol to ICCPR of 1966, Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT) of 
1984, and the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court of 1998 - jointly proscribe 
the types of human rights violations that can be frequently observed in counterterrorism 
practices of states.  
The counterterrorism conventions are binding on states that signed and ratified 
them. The existence of obligations arising from these counterterrorism treaties and the 
importance of compliance with international counterterrorism norms have been 
repeatedly stressed by the UN Security Council and individual states. Specifically, UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) called on all states to become parties to the 
listed international conventions and outlined extensive counterterrorism measures binding 
on states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. There has been widespread observance of 
the provisions of counterterrorism treaties evidenced in the reports submitted by the vast 
majority of states to the Counterterrorism Committee established to monitors states’ 
compliance with international counterterrorism regulations.  
ICCPR with its Optional Protocols, CAT, and the Rome Statue are a global 
expression of the broadest set of rights articulated in a binding treaty form. The high level 
of formal acceptance of these international agreements suggests substantial progress 
toward global recognition of human rights norms enumerated in these documents. The 
UN human rights agencies and international human rights organizations have repeatedly 
stated that states had an irrevocable obligation to protect human rights, particularly, when 
struggle against terrorism.  
Following the general practice of using treaty ratification as a measure of 
normative guidelines in the quantitative research,58 I, too, employ treaty ratifications as 
an empirical indicator of recognition of the existence of international norms by individual 
states. Treaty ratification results in incorporation of the treaty norms into domestic law. 
Governments ratifying a treaty formalize and heighten visibility of their commitment to 
norms codified in it.59  
In this study, I use two measures of the strength of international norms, namely, 
relative commonality and durability of norms. The relative commonality of norms is 
measured as a difference between the average number of ratifications of human rights 
treaties in a given year and an average number of ratifications of counterterrorism treaties 
in the same year by all states of the world. The relative durability of norms is measured 
as a difference between the average number of years lapsed since the major human rights 
treaties went into force and the average number of years lapsed since the major 
counterterrorism conventions entered into force. I generated the norms variables using 
data on treaties deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations or other 
depositories from the United Nations Treaty Collection.60  
I use Gross National Income per Capita (GNI per capita)61 as a measure of state 
economic development. Consistent with earlier studies of state repression, I include state 
population as a control variable measured by total population (both sexes) in thousands 
of people.62 The log-transformations of these variables are used in the regression.  
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The US has been the largest donor of foreign aid to the states selected for this 
study. I use the dollar value of total US economic and military assistance, in millions, 
constant 2004$US.63 A one-year lag of the variable is used in the regression.  In addition 
to the described variables, I included a 9/11 dummy variable into the right hand-side of 
the regression. This variable is coded as 0 for all years preceding 9/11 and 1 for 2001 and 
consequent years.  
Methodology of Analysis 
To test the impact of identified factors on the extent of security rights violations in the 
context of counterterrorism, I used a pooled time-series cross-sectional design. To deal 
with the problem of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of errors damaging to the 
tests of statistical significance, I used Beck and Katz’s panel corrected standard error.64 A 
variation of White’s65 robust standard errors developed by Beck and Katz for time-series 
cross-sectional data produce standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation within the cross-sectional units. Random effects model is warranted by the 
results of the Hausman test, which checks a more efficient (random effects) model 
against a less efficient (fixed effects) but consistent model to ensure that the more 
efficient model also gives consistent results.  
The distribution of the dependent variable has certain features that can bias the 
estimates received from ordinary least squares. The Poisson regression models are often 
applied to variables, which distributions are skewed, non-negative, and have variances 
that increase as means increase.66 However, since the data shows a pattern of 
overdispersion, the Poisson regression that requires an assumption of equality of the 
conditional mean and the conditional variance will underestimate standard errors. A good 
alternative to the Poisson is the negative binomial distribution that has a variance which 
is larger than the mean. To ensure the robustness of findings, I use negative binomial 
regression with robust standard errors clustered over states to re-estimate the basic model.   
Findings and Implications 
Table 2 presents results received from the statistical analysis of security rights violations 
committed in the name of combating terrorism tested on a sample of post-Soviet states. 
The first two columns report parameters’ estimates of the linear cross-sectional time-
series random effects model of security rights violations measured by maximum and 
minimum scores correspondingly, whereas the last two columns contain results from the 
negative binomial regression with robust standard errors clustered over states.  
As expected, the magnitude of terrorism measured by the total number of deaths 
and injuries from all terrorist attacks that occurred in a state in a given year has a positive 
effect on security rights violations. Yet, this impact is neither statistical significant nor 
substantively large.  
  As hypothesized, the higher levels of political conflict reveal increase the 
likelihood of security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. This impact is 
statistically significant (at 0.01 and 0.05 levels of significance) in all tests, except the 
linear cross-sectional time-series regression performed on the minimum scores of security 
rights violations. The size of the coefficients on the variable of political conflict, ranging 
from =β̂ 0.286 to =β̂ 0.348 depending on the kind of estimation suggests that only 
violent conflicts – crises and wars – have a manifest effect on the security rights 
violations in the context of counterterrorism.  
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 The past levels of security rights violations have a positive and highly statistically 
significant (at 0.01 level) impact on the current levels of human rights violations. The 
lagged dependent variable is one of the strongest predictors. Substantively, the strong 
coefficients for the past security rights violations mean that a heavy hand of institutional 
and behavioral history continues to guide the current policy choices of decision-makers.  
Table 2. Estimates of Security Rights Violations 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variables 
 
Linear Cross-Sectional Time-
Series Model 
 
Negative Binomial Regression 
Maximum 
Security 
Rights 
Violations  
Minimum 
Security 
Rights 
Violations 
Maximum 
Security 
Rights 
Violations 
Minimum 
Security 
Rights 
Violations 
Magnitude of   
terrorism 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.0007) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.00001 
0.00033 
Political 
conflict 
0.348** 
(0.171) 
0.183 
(0.129) 
0.313*** 
(0.0176 
0.286*** 
(0.103) 
Past security 
rights violations 
0.457*** 
(0.099) 
0.489*** 
(0.090) 
0.147*** 
(0.031) 
0.193*** 
(0.055) 
Democracy -0.042* 
(0.022) 
-0.020 
(0.023) 
-0.048** 
(0.021) 
-0.435 
(0.293) 
LnGNI per 
capita 
-0.38*** 
(0.106) 
-0.332*** 
(0.101) 
-0.371*** 
(0.074) 
-0.504*** 
(0.134) 
LnPopulation 0.128 
(0.122) 
0.061 
(0.076) 
0.116* 
(0.06) 
0.120 
(0.095) 
US assistance -0.0016 
(0.0012) 
0.001* 
(0.0008) 
-0.0005* 
(0.00026) 
0.00065** 
(0.00032) 
Norms’ 
commonality 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.0032 
(0.0075) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.0041 
(0.0059) 
Norms’ 
durability 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.106** 
(0.048) 
-0.064* 
(0.037) 
-0.0848** 
(0.0435) 
Pre/post 9/11 -0.223 
(0.300) 
0.048 
(0.245) 
-0.132 
(0.169) 
-0.039 
(0.204) 
Constant 2.99** 
(1.39) 
2.93*** 
(1.105) 
9.80 
(15.06) 
17.80 
(512.19) 
R2 0.648 0.639   
N 192 192 192 192 
Wald test (χ2) 437.52*** 298.25*** 217.42*** 108.53*** 
Log-likelihood   -278.92 -238.37 
 
Note: All results were obtained with STATA, release 8.  
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 
 Democracy, as expected, is negatively related to security rights violations in the 
context of counterterrorism: the more democratic states have fewer instances of human 
rights abuses, and this impact is statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the models 
estimated on the maximum scores of security rights violations. Substantively, however, 
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the mitigating impact of democracy appears to be trivial, suggesting that both democratic 
and non-democratic states are prone to circumvent security rights of the suspects of 
terrorism, everything else being equal.  
The impact of GNI per capita is in the predicted direction: states with the higher 
values of GNI per capita have lower scores on security rights violations in the context of 
counterterrorism. This finding is statistically significant at 0.01 level across all models. 
Country population, as expected, is positively related to the dependent variable: the most 
populous states in the sample have higher rates of security rights violations, keeping other 
factors constant. The parameter coefficients on the population variable are statistically 
insignificant, however.   
The results of the impact of US foreign aid on security rights violations are not 
consistent across models. In the regression performed on the minimum scores on security 
rights violations, the impact is in the predicted direction: the higher levels of US foreign 
aid are associated with higher levels of security rights violations in the context of 
counterterrorism. In the models, where the dependent variable is measured by the 
maximum scores, the influence of US foreign assistance is negative, albeit statistically 
insignificant at 0.05 level. Across all models, the estimated coefficients on the variable of 
US foreign assistance are very small suggesting that if foreign aid has any influence on 
the human rights practices within states, it takes hundreds of thousands of US dollars to 
instigate minor changes in either direction. 
 Both measures of international norms – relative commonality and relative 
durability of human rights vs. counterterrorism treaties – show effects in the predicted 
direction of impact. The commonality of norms is statistically significant at 0.01 levels in 
the model with maximum scores on security rights violations, whereas the durability of 
norms reveals statistically significant impact (at 0.05 level) in the models estimated using 
minimum scores. The higher values on the variable measuring the commonality of norms 
indicate greater commonality of human rights norms compared to counterterrorism 
norms. Since the variable’s beta coefficient is negative, the greater commonality of 
human rights norms compared to counterterrorism norms is associated with fewer 
security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. To put it differently, as the 
number of states ratifying counterterrorism conventions increases relative to the number 
of states which have ratified human rights conventions, security rights violations 
committed in the name of counterterrorism can be expected to grow, holding other factors 
constant. Similar interpretation applies to the durability of norms variable, which 
measures annual differences between the number of years passed since the entry into 
force major human rights and counterterrorism treaties. The coefficient on norms’ 
durability is also negative. It means that the longer, on average, human rights treaties 
have been in force, compared to counterterrorism treaties, the lower the rate of security 
rights violations can be expected to be.  
The last variable included into the models is the pre/post 9/11 measure. Contrary 
to the expectation, it shows no positive and significant effect on security rights violations 
in the context of counterterrorism. This finding means that even if there have been 
changes in the degree and ‘style’ of security rights violations in the context of 
counterterrorism on the post-Soviet space, those are not directly associated with the 
terrorist attacks that took place on the US soil. Attributing changes in the worldwide 
human rights practices to the 9/11 would be an oversimplification of much deeper and 
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more intricate processes unfolding on the international stage that created an environment 
conducive to the rise of international terrorism and permissible of human rights violations 
in the name of combating it. The dummy pre/post 9/11 variable is inappropriate for 
measuring the complex dynamics of global relations and politics that triggered those 
changes. It is also possible that the effects of the 9/11 and subsequent counterterrorism 
responses adopted by individual states have been more pronounced on political and civil 
freedoms, than in the area of security rights examined in this research.  
The R-squared of 0.64 yielded by regressions indicates that the theoretical model 
of security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism has satisfactory 
explanatory power. Although, specification errors cannot be entirely ruled out, there are 
legitimate theoretical reasons for confidence in the findings. Many findings remain 
consistent across different statistical estimations suggesting the overall robustness of 
statistical results. 
Discussion of Findings  
The statistical analysis presented in this research examined the impact of terrorist 
violence, political conflict, past human rights practices, international norms, and a 
number of other variables on security rights violations of the suspected terrorists in a 
sample of post-Soviet states. The findings received from statistical tests lent empirical 
support to some explanations of security rights violations, while challenged other 
hypotheses inviting further investigation into states’ human rights practices in the context 
of counterterrorism.  
A quintessential assumption favored in the academic, political, and media circles 
is that the magnitude of terrorist violence experienced by a state determines the intensity 
of its counterterrorism responses. Contrary to this widespread view, I found no empirical 
support for the impact of terrorist attacks on security rights violations. Ceteris paribus, 
the governments of the post-Communist states do not respond directly to objective levels 
of terrorist threat, and the magnitude of terrorism, by itself, is a weak determinant of 
security rights violations in these nations. 
This outcome is at odds with this study’s predictions. Yet, it concurs with some 
estimates of the earlier research and conclusions of human rights organizations.67 It is not 
that uncommon for a state facing minimal terrorist threat to adopt very radical 
counterterrorism measures since responses to terrorism are determined not only by 
statistical risks but also the government’s interests and perceptions. That is why the future 
research should inquire into leaders’ perceptions of threats and examine contextual 
factors that can influence their threat assessment.  
In the estimated models, the context of strife appears to shape governments’ threat 
assessment: political conflict turned out to be a stronger predictor of violations of security 
rights by the post-Communist nations. The relationship between political turbulence and 
security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism has been premised on the 
assumption that staying in power and maintaining control is the leaders’ primary 
motivation. When political conflicts pose a challenge to the ruling regime, the latter will 
be inclined to engage in pretextual use of powers granted for fighting terrorism to crack 
down on legitimate political opposition.  
The alarming tendency of justifying human rights abuses under the guise of 
combating terrorism has long been condemned by international NGOs and human rights 
agencies of international organizations. Individual governments, too, should use all 
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available diplomatic and political means to steer repressive governments away from 
exploiting the tools of counterterrorism for brutalizing political opponents. The use of 
extreme measures, such as arbitrary detentions or politically motivated trials, may have a 
salutary short-term effect on disarming political rivals. In the long run, however, these 
measures will be counter-productive for national security and governance building. 
Human rights violations have already been noted as a major contributor to regime’s 
destabilization. Yet, the impact of security rights violations on the levels of terrorism 
within states calls for additional research. 
A growing number of inquiries into the influence of international norms have 
elevated the prominence of normative guidelines in human rights practices of individual 
states. A bulk of this research has examined the impact of one category of norms. In the 
real-life world, however, human rights norms do not stand in isolation; they complement, 
interpenetrate, and, sometimes, collide with other international norms.68 There are, for 
example, two broad categories of normative regulations pertinent to security measures 
aimed at combating terrorism - international human rights norms and counterterrorism 
norms, and those norms are amenable to conflicting interpretation. Wide-ranging 
measures against terrorism codified in the international counterterrorism conventions 
were declared mandatory on all states by the Security Council of the United Nations. 
Absent from the Security Council resolutions is any attempt to define terrorism. Absent 
from the work of the Counterterrorism Committee of the Security Council is any 
emphasis on human rights. These aspects of the framework for countering global 
terrorism leave governments with wide latitude for interpretation and action. To limit 
governments’ ability to get away with human rights abuses committed under the guise of 
combating terrorism, it may be necessary to create a special agency within the framework 
of UN institutions administering counterterrorism programs that will monitor the impact 
of counterterrorism measures on human rights. The government should not appeal to the 
heinous nature of terrorist violence as a basis for sidestepping their international 
obligations, particularly concerning the safeguards of human rights. As greater numbers 
of states joins international and regional counterterrorism conventions, governments need 
to be reminded of the compatibility of counterterrorism provisions with human rights law 
and instructed to observe human freedoms when carrying out their counterterrorism 
operations.  
This study assumed that the ruling elites are susceptible to the normative impact 
and attributed their decision to comply with the human rights or counterterrorism norms 
to the strength of these international norms. Two qualities of the norms that determine 
their strength vis-à-vis each other are the relative commonality and durability of norms. 
The outcomes of statistical tests seem to suggest that the greater commonality and 
durability of human rights norms compared to counterterrorism norms is associated with 
fewer security rights violations in the context of counterterrorism. A few caveats are, 
however, in order. Since this impact was not systematically consistent, there is a need for 
the future empirical work to unravel the influence of counterterrorism vs. human rights 
norms. Furthermore, any measurement of norms is doomed to be imperfect due to 
intangible qualities of the international norms. An in-depth analysis of policy making 
processes in the selected nations may be in order to demonstrate the independent impact 
of normative guidelines and validate the findings of this statistical analysis.   
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A long stream of research examining the relationship between democracy and 
state repression has consistently demonstrated support to the thesis of ‘democracy as 
method of non-violence’.69 This study, too, found some impact of democracy on security 
rights violations in the selected states. This finding is noteworthy taking into 
consideration characteristics of the sample lacking fully democratic states. The majority 
of country-years (48%) used in the analysis fall within the lower end of the Polity IV 
democracy scale (levels 1-4 of DEMOC); 36% of cases can be characterized as 
transitional democracies (levels 5-7 of DEMOC); and only 16% are ranked at levels 8 and 
above of the democracy scale. It has been argued that the impact of the middle levels of 
democracy on repression is more complex.70 In the absence of full-fledged institutional 
constraints characterizing political systems of fully democratic states, governments of 
transitional nations have more leverage to use repression. Political elites of the ‘mid-way’ 
democracies are more vulnerable to political turbulence common to transitional states 
and, therefore, more inclined to use negative sanctions for maintaining their power. The 
nascent democratic institutions characterizing one third of the states in the sample 
showed to be sufficient for generating a mild pacifying impact on governments of those 
states. 
The study found positive relationships between US foreign aid and security rights 
violations in one model, and negative, yet, statistically insufficient or bordering on 
statistical significant in another. Taken together, these results suggest that if the US aid 
might have an effect on human rights practices, this influence is at best only minuscule, 
and further investigation into the impact of foreign assistance on the intensity of states’ 
counterterrorism responses must take place to validate these claims.   
 All in all, the results of the present analysis call on us to take seriously the 
warnings about human rights casualties of the governments’ counterterrorism responses. 
Many fundamental human liberties have been severely cut back in democratic, 
transitional, and non-democratic states. The introduction of extensive counterterrorism 
policies in liberal democratic nations sparkled heated debates about the proper balance 
between human rights and security responses. Yet, this debate and concerns over the 
fallout from curtailment of human rights in the name of security from terrorism have not 
been limited to established democratic states. The ways in which transitional and young 
democracies resolve the tension between security and human rights will be consequential 
for both the spread of democracy and the success of our efforts to combat terrorism word-
wide.    
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Appendix. Outline of Coding Rules 
The following coding rules are extracted from the manual prepared for collecting data on 
security rights violations of the suspects of terrorism.71 The latter category includes 
individuals prosecuted for terrorist crimes, their relatives and supporters (e.g., when 
security forces raid communities that are believed harboring alleged terrorists), and 
persons acquainted with or related to the presumed terrorist suspects (e.g., human rights 
defenders of the suspects of terrorism).  
 These coding rules were applied for the content analysis of reports identified by 
means of search commands that returned only those news articles containing information 
on states’ human rights practices in the content of counterterrorism.  
Extrajudicial execution 
Extrajudicial executions are the killings by the government resulting from the 
deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by police, security forces, or other 
agents of states (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). The special cases of extrajudicial 
executions are: 
(a) Executions after unfair trials. When a report cites executions of individuals 
charged with terrorism-related crimes, and the trials of those individuals are registered as 
unfair, their death sentences are coded as extrajudicial executions.  
(b) Deaths that resulted from torture. If a report mentions a death which occurred 
while prisoners were in the custody of government as a result of torture, this death should 
be coded as extrajudicial killing. 
(c) Political killings. Assassinations of individuals by state’s agents because of 
their political views or for the purpose of intimidating communities are coded as 
extrajudicial executions of terrorist suspects if those individuals are publicly referred to 
as terrorists. 
(d) Killings that resulted from indiscriminate fire, use of excessive lethal forth 
during raids on terrorist cells, for dispersing demonstrations, or meetings allegedly posing 
terrorist threat to national security.  
Torture 
Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or 
physical, by the government’s agents or by private individuals at the instigation of 
government officials (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). 
Any of the following practices are coded as torture: boiling, drowning, prolonged 
solitary confinement, mock executions, rape, sleep deprivation, whipping. Among other 
types of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that are typically 
considered as torture are severe beatings and physical violence, administering shock or 
electrocution, threats to use force or torture against a targeted individual or his/her 
relatives. 
Unlawful arrests and detentions 
An arrest or detention is coded as unlawful if it comprises any of the following: 
(a) Incommunicado detention, i.e., the families of detained individuals are not 
informed of the arrest and/or not allowed to visit the detainee; the detainee is not allowed 
to speak or write to anyone, or receive correspondence while in detention;   
(b) Refusal of legal aid, i.e., the detainee is not provided with a legal 
representative to discuss charges, or is prohibited from seeking legal assistance; 
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(c) Violations of the right to be informed of the reasons for arrests or legal 
charges;  
(d) Lack of judicial control over arrests and detentions, i.e., the legality of arrests 
and detentions is not checked by courts or supervisory institutions, or the request to hear 
the case of the legality of arrest is turned down;  
(e) Prolonged detention, i.e., the detainee is held in pre-trial custody beyond the 
terms specified in criminal legislation and/or the prolongation of detention was not 
decided by an impartial court; 
(f) Detention of individuals who do not personally threaten state security but are 
kept as ‘bargaining chips’ in order to receive testimonies, confessions, or promote 
negotiations with other parties; and 
(g) When abductions are used to bring an individual under the custody of state.  
Unfair trials  
Fair trial is based on the principles of the presumption of innocence, right to a 
legal council, the right to silence, and the right not to incriminate oneself or other 
defendants. If a report mentions violations of any of the listed rights, the trial is coded as 
unfair. Specifically, when:  
(a) Accused was not presumed innocent; 
(b) Accused was not granted fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. This includes hearings closed to public and international observers, 
lack of legal representation in the court, or when accused and/or his/her representative 
were not properly informed of the charges. It also includes situations when defendants 
and lawyers were constrained in the number and length of their meetings, when attorneys 
were not given proper access to the case before the hearing until it is very late, or, when 
lawyers were given limited or no opportunity to introduce evidence for the defense.  
(c) When torture was used during investigation and the court did not pay due 
consideration to the fact of torture, particularly when a defendant pleas guilty; 
(d) When the defendant is tried on the charges that did not constitute a crime at 
the time it was committed. 
Disappearances 
Disappearances refer to the cases in which people vanished, typically because 
their views or activities, and have not been found (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). A 
special case of the disappearance of terrorist suspects is the so-called ‘clandestine 
detention’, i.e., when it is apparent that individuals are held in state’s custody but their 
whereabouts are not known.  
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